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the 
War 
In the conclusion to our 1989 report to the Academic Council on 
the United Nations System on the state of the UN, Professor Roger 
Coate and I questioned the continuing relevance of a world organization 
chartered in 1945 and focused programmatically on preventing a 
recurrence of conditions that caused World War 11.1 Structurally, the 
UN had not evolved as world conditions changed during a half century, 
and we therefore wondered whether the organization was capable of 
usefully dealing with the international issues of the late 20th Century 
and beyond. 
Our skepticism was fueled by two observations: first, the 
sensitivity, creativity and practical effectiveness of the United Nations 
are all constrained by its intergovernmental character. The UN remains 
an organization of states, a club where governments meet, and this 
dramatically affects what it can and cannot do in important policy 
realms. Second, the United Nations is a global organization, and its 
agenda perforce focuses on global problems. While it is true that 
mankind does have a number of common problems, not least among 
them insuring survival by controlling nuclear weapons, it is also the 
case today that regional, national and local problems are the most 
urgent. The United Nations however, is not well-equipped to work 
below the global level either conceptually or practically. 
The challenge for the United Nations today, and therefore the 
starting point for any serious discussion of UN reform, is how to stay 
relevant as an intergovernmental, global organization in a world where 
multilateral interactions among national governments are not 
appropriate approaches to many pressing problems, and where the 
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the conference on "A 
New World Order and the Reform of the United Nations ," Kyung Hee 
University, Seoul, Korea, September 21-22, 1993. 
1 Donald J. Puchala and Roger A. Coate, The Challenge of Relevance : 
The United Nations in a Changing World Environment (Dartmouth, NH : 
The Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1989). While this 
essay proceeds from collaborative efforts between Coate and Puchala, 
perspectives and conclusions presented here are Puchala's alone. 
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majority of global issues, whatever their rhetorical worth, are mostly of 
marginal practical concern. Reforming the United Nations, therefore, 
ought to be an exercise in identifying and maximizing the 
Organization's comparative advantages as a policy instrument for the 
international community. The UN ought to do more of what it does 
best as an intergovernmental, global organization, and it ought to exit 
policy realms where its intergovernmental structure and global 
orientation render it less than effective. 
The UN in the Peacekeeping Niche 
UN-styled intergovemmentalism still finds an apparent niche in the 
post-Cold War environment in the area of peacekeeping and its policy 
progeny, peacemaking and peacebuilding. While serious questions need 
to be raised about the efficacy of UN armed interventions into regional 
and national conflicts, such activities are being rendered imperative by 
post-cold war international conditions. If the first few years of the post-
Cold War era are indicative of world affairs to come, we may 
realistically expect recurrent future conflict based upon reasserted claims 
for national, ethnic and religious autonomy. It is hardly necessary to 
rehearse how cold war political and ideological conformities, voluntary 
and enforced, suppressed ethnic tensions, how the superpowers 
controlled their clients and subdued conflicts among them, how fear and 
favors muted within-bloc rivalries and how allied elites supported by 
Washington or Moscow owed their tenure to setting bloc interests 
above national aspirations. Almost all of this is now over, and the 
result is proliferating, nationalistically-kindled disorder. Added to this 
is the congeries of continuing conflicts -- in Palestine, Somalia, 
Cambodia, Southern Africa, Nicaragua, Kashmir, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere -- that have carried over from the cold war era. There are also 
numerous simmering issues about borders in the Persian Gulf region, 
islands in the China Sea, water and riparian rivalries and stalemates in 
still-divided countries. While these post-cold war conflicts immediately 
threaten only those parties directly involved, many of them have 
escalatory potential and thus threaten more widely. Even as localized 
contests, they destroy lives, undermine livelihoods , lay waste to 
property and belie any image of peace prevailing at Francis Fukuyama's 
"end of history."2 
For the moment, and into the foreseeable future, the UN is 
uniquely available for such peacekeeping assignments . Peacemaking 
and peacekeeping as established under Chapters VI and VII of the 
2Francis Fukuyama , "The End of History ?" The Na1ional Interest 16 
(Summer, 1989), pp. 3-18. 
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Charter are in fact the principal raison d'etre for the UN of the early 21st 
Century. 
Ironically, the ending of the Cold War not only unleashed the 
disorders of our day, but it also presented the status quo powers with an 
enhanced means for dealing with them. The termination of East-West 
rivalry allowed the invigoration of the United Nations Security Council 
because the five permanent members were able, for the first time since 
the UN's founding, to consistently cooperate. Actions under Chapter 
VII of the Charter therefore became possible, and indeed have been 
engaged in the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, 
because in the post-cold war era the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations has been able to count upon the strong, consistent support of 
the Security Council, actions under Chapter VI of the Charter, having 
to do with good offices, fact-finding and impartial third-party mediation, 
have also become more authoritative and quite effective, particularly in 
instances like the political settlement brokered by the United Nations in 
El Salvador and in aspects of the political reconstruction of Cambodia. 
Overall, the UN's capacities for peacekeeping and peacemaking have 
been significantly strengthened precisely at the historical moment when 
there is increased need for such capacities. 
Among international agencies that could conceivably perform the 
peacekeeping/ peacemaking function, the United Nations is best 
qualified. It is the only political organization with military capability 
that can claim to represent the entire international community. While 
there is much that is fictitious about this claim, since UN peacekeeping 
actually represents a consensus only of the Security Council and more 
particularly of its five permanent members, allowing the fiction to 
stand legitimizes UN interventions on grounds that no other agency can 
claim -- i.e., action in the name of the international community. On 
these grounds, the UN is a more acceptable intervenor, in non-Western 
areas especially, than anyone else. Equally, important, over many years 
the United Nations has accumulated a significant amount of experience 
at intervening as peacemaker and peacekeeper . This is certainly true 
with regard to various kinds of armed interventions, of which there have 
been dozens under UN auspices. 3 What is less well recognized, but 
highly noteworthy, is that there have also been hundreds of UN 
interventions as mediator, arbitrator, impartial third-party, conciliator 
and adjudicator, and considerable valuable experience has accumulated in 
this realm as well.4 There has traditionally been a distinguished corps 
of peacemaking and peacekeeping professionals aiding the Secrtetary-
3Unit ed Nations, The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations 
Peacekeeping (New York: The United Nations, 2nd edition, 1990). 
4K. Venkata Raman (ed.) Dispute Settlemenl Through the United Nations 
(UNIT AR, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1977), passim. 
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General, a group that George Sherry identifies as "the second UN." 5 
They are the best in the world at what they do. In recent years 
particularly, the UN membership has been willing to allow the 
Organization additional resources to engage in peacekeeping and 
peacemaking (though these remain woefully inadequate) and the most 
powerful countries in the world have been willing to allow the UN, via 
the Security Council, to assume leadership in peacemaking and 
peacekeeping to an historically unprecendented degree. No other agency 
has the legitimacy, the expertise, the resources or the mandate for 
peacemaking and peacekeeping today held by the UN; the world 
organization remains uniquely positioned to meet international needs. 
One important reason why UN peacekeeping has been and can 
continue to be successful is because it involves activities that are not 
seriously hampered by the intergovernmental character of the 
Organization. They are activities that the United Nations, as presently 
structured , can conduct in a multilateral, political-diplomatic context 
where all relevant participants are the agents of governments of 
sovereign states. On peace and security questions, traditionally trained 
and socialized diplomats, representing foreign ministries, calculating in 
terms of perceived national interest defined largely as position, power or 
prestige , are the principal interlocutors. National governments are the 
primary targets (and beneficiaries) of peacekeeping operations. These 
operations are facilitated by the structure of power among states, and the 
major powers, acting in their own self-interests, using the UN, initiate 
peacekeeping and take and accept responsibility for it. Traditional UN 
peacekeeping only minimally involves non-governmental organizations 
or transnational ones, and it requires not even a modicum of 
supranationality to initiate or execute. It calls up no technical expertise 
that diplomats or soldiers do not already bring to their professions. 
In addition, without understating the significance of the traditional 
accomplishments of the United Nations in peacekeeping, it should be 
noted that, in terms of UN policy-making, peacekeeping matters have 
not been very complex. The traditional mode of UN military 
intervention is into international conflicts where fighting has already 
been halted, and where ceasefires or armistices need to be impartially 
monitored. Here the United Nations typically inserts itself, or, more 
accurately , the Security Council inserts UN-recruited military forces , 
between antagonists to deter provocations and insure compliance with 
hostility-halting agreements. 
Notably, most of these situations involve a relatively small 
number of semi-autonomous participants; most of the communications 
and involvements of personnel intergovernmental ; most of the required 
5George L. Sherry, "The United Nations, International Conflict and 
American Security ," Political Science Quarterly , 101 :5 (1986), pp . 753-
771. 
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national inputs come from single or closely inter-related ministries 
(e.g.,foreign affairs and defense), relatively few UN organs are directly 
involved, and these are typically among the bureaucratically most 
efficient ones. Overall, in favorable political contexts, a formal 
intergovernmental organization like the United Nations should be able 
to manage the kinds of issues and problems that traditional 
peacekeeping presents, and, with a very few exceptions, the UN has 
been quite good at peacekeeping. There is no obvious reason why the 
UN should not continue to be a most useful instrument for 
peacekeeping in the traditional mode here described. 
But today the challenge confronting the United Nations in 
promoting peace and security is that many of the conflicts into which it 
is being injected require mounting operations that do not fit the model 
of traditional peacekeeping. For one thing, the kinds of situations into 
which the UN is typically being asked to intervene in the post-Cold 
War Era fall into operational "grey areas" between traditional 
impositions to separate warring parties and full-scale military 
enforcement against aggressors. UN interventions are projections into 
countries rather than interpositions between them, because small- and 
large-scale, intercommunal civil wars seem to be emerging as the most 
frequently recurring threat to world peace. Formally, the international 
legality of such United Nations interventions remains ambiguous under 
the United Nations Charter where Chapter I proscribes intervention "in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state," but Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to "determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace," and "decide what measures 
should be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and 
security." 
In practice, the Security Council has already chosen to broaden the 
allowable range of UN intervention, and even to define humanitarian 
crises, as in Somalia, as threats to peace that may entitle the 
international community to go into countries uninvited. In extreme 
cases of anarchy, such as Somalia became in 1992 and other African 
countries could shortly become, the United Nations confronts the 
problem of having no national government to deal with at all. Along 
with this come the legalities and practicalities of relating as an 
intergovernmental international organization to nonsovereign entities of 
unknown legitimacy, capability, dependability and responsibility. 
Complicating such situations is the reality that anarchies almost always 
contain multiple contending entities so that it is rarely possible Lo find 
only two sides in conflict. Here it is usually fanciful to try to identify 
aggressors, and especially difficult to maintain impartiality. 
Complicating contemporary UN interventions, and moving them 
even farther in form from traditional peacekeeping is the fact that many 
situations nowadays require United Nations entrance while armed 
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hostilities are ongoing. While the UN typically does not "go in 
shooting," it more and more frequently "goes in getting shot at." Such 
interventions therefore are neither armistice monitorings, as in Cyprus, 
nor combat operations, as during the Gulf War: they are a variety of 
things in between and they necessitate preparations, deployments and 
armaments fundamentally different from those of the past. Blue 
helmets, checklists, checkpoints, white jeeps and inconspicuous, light 
sidearms will no longer do. 
Interventions today are also much more complex than those of the 
past: they often have humanitarian as well as military dimensions; 
they require civilian as well as military personnel; and they involve 
delicate balancings between military measures aimed at halting or 
deterring hostilities and diplomatic measures aimed at resolving 
conflicts. The only UN military intervention in the past that 
approached the present norm of complexity was the Congo Operation, 
and most agree, by hindsight, that this experience for the UN was 
disappointing. 6 
If the United Nations is to remain relevant and promising as the 
international peacekeeper of the early 21st century, important 
conceptual actitivities need to be engaged. The new circumstances 
surrounding UN military interventions, and particularly how they differ 
from traditional peacekeeping, have to be better understood both by 
those who would direct the United Nations to intervene , and by those 
who will implement the directions. Appropriate ends, means and 
missions have to be mapped for UN action in situations that are neither 
traditional peacekeeping operations nor enforcement actions against 
aggressors. Appropriate preparations, including training, earmarked 
forces and predeployed equipment, have to be conceived and engaged. 
Arguing that neither the United Nations Secretariat , nor Security 
Council members have yet seriously undertaken to rethink 
contingencies and requirements for UN peacekeeping under emergent 
world conditions, Columbia University's John G. Ruggie admonished 
in a recent Foreiqn Affairs commentary that the UN's failure to fully 
understand and doctrinally adjust to the new circumstances surrounding 
peacekeeping have "brought the world body to the point of outright 
strategic failure."7 At first imperative in UN reform, then, is to think 
through and better conceptualize the Organization's peacekeeping role 
under political-military conditions prevailing today. 
At a more practical level, other UN reformers are today suggesting 
that the UN needs to be better informed about volatile situations around 
6Emest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate : Politics of the U.N .. Congo 
Operation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 
passim . See also, The Blue Helmets , op. cit., pp. 215-259 . 
7John Gerard Ruggie, "The U.N.: Wandering in the Void, " Foreign 
Affairs, 72:5 (November/December 1993), p . 26. 
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the world and especially better informed about situations into which the 
Organization is being asked to intervene. The Secretary-General's 
access to timely information about brewing trouble needs to be greatly 
improved The Secretariat's data-gathering and analysis capabilities need 
to be improved and more directly linked to the Secretary-General's 
Office. 8 No matter how strong the opposition from member states, 
something resembling a UN diplomatic service, with representation and 
reporting capabilities at permanent missions around the world needs to 
be established. 
The size of the UN professional staff managing peacemaking 
missions and peacekeeping operations needs to be substantially 
enlarged. Steps need to be taken to minimize, indeed to eliminate, the 
ad hoc procedures typically followed in the assembling, dispatching and 
deploying of blue-helmeted military forces. Some appropriately trained 
and quickly deployable UN forces should be permanently established. 
Other appropriately trained peacekeeping units should be continually 
available in the military forces of member states and held ready for UN 
service. Policies should be formulated that guarantee that UN 
peacekeepers are appropriately armed for their assigned missions, and 
rules of engagement should be set down which actually allow the UN to 
show force when contingencies require. 9 There is considerable, and 
understandable, concern among member governments about giving the 
UN its own military forces. But, if the Organization is going to be 
repeatedly asked to place young men and women in harm's way, the 
international community must see to it that its peacekeeping 
interventions are of the highest professional military quality, even if 
this involves establishing a United Nations army. 
Needless to say, the UN's unique capacity for conducting 
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the post-Cold War world 
depends crucially upon the abilitiy of the members of the Security 
Council, especially the Permanent Five, to continue to find consensus. 
For the time being at least, none of the major powers appears interested 
in fomenting or abetting regional or national conflicts, in letting these 
escalate, or in intervening unilaterally to control them. Indeed, each of 
8Connie Peck, "Preventive Diplomacy: A Perspective for the 1990s," 
Occasional Papers Series, Number XIII (New York: The Ralph Bunche 
Institute on the United Nations, February 1993), pp. 6-13; George L. 
Sherry, "The United Nations Reborn: Conflict Control in the Post -Cold 
War World, " Critical Issues 90.2 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1990), p. 27. 
9Edward C. Luck, "Steps Toward UN Reform," internal memorandum, 
United Nations Association of the United States, New York, March 19, 
1993, p. 4; See also, United States Commission on Improving the 
Effectiveness of the United Nations , Defining Purpose : The U.N. and the 
Health of Nations (Washington: September, 1993), pp . 20-2 1. 
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the major powers appears lo favor the emerging muhipolar status quo, 
which not only privileges them in diplomacy and commerce, but allows 
them respite for attention to domestic affairs. Should the major power 
consensus breakdown, however, the peacemaking capacity of the United 
Nations would be greatly diminished and the Organization's 
peacekeeping capacity would all but vanish. The results would be 
similar, incidentally, if the UN goes bankrupt: the financing of UN 
peacekeeping activities, along with the general financing of the 
organization urgently require top-to-bottom overhaul. 10 
Development via Diplomacy? 
Positively speaking, most of the reforms required to render the 
United Nations a more effective peacekeeper in the post-Cold War 
world , are accomplishable. The costs and threats of emergent disorder 
could very well impel the international community to progressively 
enhance the UN's peacekeeping capacities in coming years, in the 
course of which the needed reforms would be set in place. However, as 
orginally conceived and as written into the Charter, the UN was to 
function not only as peacemaker and peacekeeper, but also as peace -
builder. The Organization was supposed to foster and nurture human 
conditions that contributed to peace by eliminating the scarcities, 
inequities and injustices that people have been historically prone to 
fight about. To its credit, the United Nations contributed pivotally to 
eliminating colonialism and the injustice that this practice both 
symbolized and perpetrated. 11 But, the Organization over several 
decades has accomplished precious little toward enhancing the material 
well-being of the poverty-engulfed peoples of the post-colonial world. 
While it is true that the United Nations has been able to mobilize 
humanitarian assistance in crisis situations, it is nonetheless difficult to 
find much positive UN influence in the area of development however 
this term is defined. Economic growth accompanied by enhanced 
human well-being has occurred in recent decades, particularly in Asia 
and some parts of Latin America. But the reasons for this growth 
hardly have lo do with the UN. Il could even be argued that for some 
countries, like the Republic of China, South Korea and Singapore, 
economic development followed from pursuing policies that not only 
shunned UN assistance , but outrightly rejected the prevailing doctrines 
of the United Nations developers. It would appear therefore that if the 
UN has comparative programmatic advantage anywhere, this advantage 
is surely not in the realm of development. 
10Independent Advisory Group on U .N . Financing, Finan cing an 
Effective United Nations (Ford Foundation: New York, 1993), pp . 14-21. 
11 David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), passim. 
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Explaining the United Nation's failure as a development institution 
is involved. Surely, the deeply underlying reason for its unimpressive 
record is the combination of intellectual arrogance and prevailing 
ignorance that has plagued Development Economics in particular, and 
development theorizing in general for forty years. 12 How to promote 
human betterment via social and economic change, is not very well 
understood, and policies to promote it have therefore rested on the 
weakest of intellectual foundations. The UN bought into development 
theorizing, or "development sloganizing," early on, and recanted, 
recouped and redirected itself every time a prevailing sloganized theory --
e.g., take-off, import subtitution, trade not aid, trickle down, basic 
human needs, marketization, sustainable development -- was discredited 
and replaced by a new one. All of the other development agencies did 
the same, with the same disappointing results. 
Beyond intellectual weakness at the foundation, a central theme in 
explaining the UN's particular shortcomings as a development 
institution is that the intergovernmental character of the Organization 
has weighed heavily against its ability to conceptualize, map and lead 
down pathways toward human material betterment. For one thing, 
governments politicize issues, even highly technical ones, and 
international organizations that include cold-warring governments 
among their members tend to polarize ideologically. This was certainly 
the case within the United Nations concerning East-West issues during 
the American-Soviet contest. It has been just as surely the case 
concerning North-South issues during the colonial-anti-colonial 
struggles and with all that has followed in their wake . The North-
South Cold War continues; indeed it is probably just beginning as a 
world historic phenomenon and will go on until the contending 
ideologies are rendered obsolete by material conditions. The contest is 
about fundamental philosophical differences between the West and the 
non-West, having to do among other things with differing conceptions 
of society and individuals ' roles. 13 It is also about deeply contrasting 
interpretations of history, about preferences in political economy, about 
differing conceptions of justice and about race . It has prevented the 
United Nations from meaningfully defining "development," from 
formulating workable strategies to promote it and from mobilizing 
resources to execute strategies. 14 
12See the symposium issue of Development magazine , particularly 
contributions by Mahbub Ul Haq, Manfred Max -Neef and Maurice Strong . 
Development, 2/3, 1988. 
13K.ishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," The National Interest, 
28 (Summer, 1992), pp. 3-13. 
14Majid Rahnema, "Under the Banner of Development ," Development, 
1/2 (1986), pp . 37-46 . 
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As a result, the intergovernmental relations of economic and social 
development, largely acted out in the UN, have been much more in the 
nature of debates aimed at fixing blame and scoring rhetorical points 
rather than about concrete projects and programmes aimed at uplifting 
destitute people. Though unproductive, the development debate among 
governments goes on: the industrialized capitalist countries of the North 
imagine that "development" must mean striving to become like them; 
the poorer countries of the South insist that "development" must mean 
striving to rid themselves of dependence on the North so that they need 
not become like them but might instead preserve their non-Western 
cultural identities. Within the UN in particular, the North-South debate 
over development has been largely about controlling the development 
discourse, which is to say, determining the way development is to be 
thought about and spoken about, which of course makes all the 
difference in determining what ought or ought not to be done about it! 
The main outcome has been that people's actual needs have been 
ignored by the debating governments, both North and South. "Forty 
years of 'development' assistance by international institutions , including 
the United Nations System," Rahnema explains, 
have shown that , despite attempts to adapt 
development theories and practices to the real needs of 
populations concerned, these institutions seem 
organically unable --and often unwilJing -- to change 
their . . . approach . Problems are seldom perceived or 
addressed according to the way the peoples themselves 
view their needs and aspirations . 'Priorities' and 
'strategies' are set independently by planners with 
their own pre-defined objectives . In reality, they have 
little to do with the way the people have lived, are 
living, wish to live.15 
In addition to the ideological barriers that cloud communication 
among governments and block meaningful cooperation , there are also 
practical reasons why intergovernmental diplomacy cannot contribute 
very much to social and economic development. It is not entirely 
surprising that the diplomacy of development has produced much more 
in the way of slogans, conferences , committees, studies, reports, 
resolutions and declarations, than poor people's lives changed for the 
better. For one thing, the technical sophistication of many 
development issues usually requires expertise beyond that typically 
possessed by diplomats , inputs beyond those which foreign ministries 
can provide, and calculations other than those which normaJiy go into 
15Ibid., p. 41. 
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traditional assessments of national interest. It is also sadly the case that 
any number of governments, in both rich and poor countries, give 
highest political and economic priority to objectives other than 
improving the quality of poor people's lives in the non-western world. 
For these regimes, the rituals of development diplomacy, particularly in 
the UN, conveniently sham largely fictitious commitments. "The 
practices and the rituals," 
. . . constitute the fragile foundations necessary both 
to maintain the fictions and to serve as useful devices 
for finding temporary solutions to otherwise basic 
contradictions. They are guarantees that the 
U.N.system remains,after all, the club which different 
Member States want it to be.16 
Consultative and negotiating processes concerning social and 
economic development frequently must involve non-governmental and 
transnational actors who have no formal role in state-to-state diplomacy 
and no formal status in traditional intergovernmental organizations. 
Non-governmental organizations, constituted at all levels from local to 
transnational, are today the custodians of vast stores of experiential 
wisdom concerning social and economic change in non-Western areas . 
They are also primary agents of development (if we define it as 
enhanced human well-being) because they are almost uniquely capable 
of reaching people whose lives are to be affected by social and economic 
change. 17 They are also almost uniquely capable of transmitting 
grassroots conceptualizations and aspirations. Yet, non-governmental 
organizations remain outside the intergovernmental nexus that generates 
the development policies and programmes of the United Nations. Both 
symbolically and often quite literally, they set their tents outside the 
great meeting halls where the world conferences are held. From there 
they lobby , criticize, prod and provoke . Some even pray! 
Governments may listen to NGOs. Some do. But the diplomacy of 
development is structured in such as way that governments can choose 
to ignore the NGOs. Many do. 
To be sure, in attempting to implement development programmes, 
the UN must and does deal with non-governmental actors, but it is 
greatly constrained in so doing because national governments resist. 
Although logical, and certainly expeditious , it is very difficult (and 
illegal under the Charter) for the United Nations , in either seeking 
information or delivering services, to circumvent national governments 
and deal directly with NGOs in the field. This is particularly true with 
16Ibid ., p. 45 . 
17Thomas F. Carroll, Intermediary NGOS : The Supporting Links in 
Grassroots Development (Hartford, Conn .: Kumarian Press, 1992), passim. 
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regard to local NGOs. Governments typically resist relinguishing 
control over activities taking place within their sovereign jurisdictions, 
and therefore often look with suspicion upon UN attempts to reach 
people. Passing through national governments, either from the 
grassroots upwards or from the United Nations downwards, can be 
highly frustrating, especially in instances where particular NGOs or 
their policies and practices are not officially favored by national 
governments. A considerable amount of UN field activity actually 
proceeds in circumvention of national governments, but having to go 
around governments is hardly an efficient way to promote development. 
Any number of reform schemes aimed at making the United 
Nations into a more effective development organization have been 
suggested. Revamping the Economic and Social Council to render it 
more of a clearing house for development plans and programmes and 
more of a UN system-wide coordinator of development undertakings is 
possible. Creating an official organ in the United Nations system to 
seat NGOs and thereby make the UN into something more than an 
intergovernmental organization is interesting. Concentrating UN 
development activities in the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund is plausible. Spinning off development activities to the 
specialized agencies is also conceivable. Ultimately, however, anything 
more than a cosmetic, and hence inconsequential, reform of the UN as a 
development institution necessarily must involve fundamentally 
altering the intergovernmental character of the Organization . This is 
more fanciful than feasible. 
The United Nations and Globalistic Fictions 
Commenting on the deliberative proceedings of one of the UN's 
specialized agencies , a Geneva-based diplomat interviewed in 1989 
remarked that "they think they are making global policies, but none of 
this has any effect on people. " In context his statement referred to the 
fact that relatively few national governments actually enforce UN 
policies contained in assumedly universally applicable resolutions. 
Yet, beyond the issue of political will there is the issue of universality 
itself . One of things that the UN does, indeed what it has been doing 
for quite some time, is to make global policies . Such policies 
purportedly speak to conditions and problems facing mankind as a 
species, or the international community as a social unit, or possibly the 
international community as a legal entity. But the unities addressed in 
the UN's global policy-making are mostly fictitious. Humanity is a 
diverse lot: there is no international "community" by any conventional 
definition of the term . There are only "communities" -- national 
communities , religious communities, cultural communities, linguistic 
communities, economic communities . Much of the mythology of 
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globalism, and of UN global policy-making, has denied the 
fragmentation of mankind because globalists aspire to overcome it. 
Furthermore, much that has come under the rubric of promoting 
globalism, and accordingly much of the content of UN global policy-
making, has been in reality a series of efforts to universalize Western 
values, practices and institutions. 18 
It is true that five hundred years of European cultural ascendance 
and political, economic and military dominance, have spread a veneer of 
westerness over mankind. 19 It is also true that Western governments 
and peoples have used international organizations like the United 
Nations to thicken this veneer because it has been much to the western 
advantage to do so. Hence, international legality is based on Western 
customs, norms and practices; human rights are Western rights born 
during Europe's 18th Century Enlightenment and institutionalized as a 
result of the American and French Revolutions; modernization and the 
development that leads to it mean becoming socially and economically 
like the West; democratization means establishing Western-stlye 
democracy. "Civilization" means Western civilization which can be 
attained by abandoning all manner of non-Western barbarisms and 
backwardness, and the policies of international organizations, insofar as 
Western powers influence them, should be directed toward suppressing 
these "uncivilized" conditions.20 
As we approach the 21st Century, it is beginning to appear as if 
the outward diffusion of Western civilization may have run its course. 
Decolonization was the initial political reaction against Western 
hegemony, but the inevitable cultural reaction was postponed by the 
ideological conformities demanded during the Cold War. With the end 
of the Cold War has come the opening phase of non-Western cultural 
reassertiveness, exhibited in phenomena like Islamic Fundamentalism, 
Hindu communalism, East Asian authoritarian developmentalism and 
Chinese cultural self-assuredness. 21 The Russian parliamentary 
elections of December, 1993 exhibited a pronounced resurfacing of 
culturally embedded, historically familiar, Westernphobic Russian 
orientalism. At the Vienna Conference on Human Rights during the 
summer of 1993, China and the Islamic countries rebutted Western 
18Rahnema, op. cit., 38-41. 
19Theodore H. Von Laue, The World Revolution of Westernization (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 11-50. 
20 Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay on Method," in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International 
Relations , Stephen Gill (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp . 58 -64; Cox, "Structural Issues of Global Governance : 
Implications for Europe," in Gill (ed.), pp. 264-276 . 
21Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 
72:3 (Summer, 1993), pp . 22-49. 
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notions about the universality of its historic principals by insisting 
upon the cultural relativity of human rights. This exchange between 
the West and the non-West was serious, and it should be read as a 
harbinger of many inter-cultural clashes to come. What these coming 
cultural contests will mean is that neither the West nor the United 
Nations is going to do very well at trying to preserve the myth of an 
international community, nor will there be much to be gained by 
promoting globalism as an ideology because it will ring hollow in the 
absence of confirming conditions. 
Philosophical issues aside, there is also a certain unreality in 
putting forth global policies to address issues and problems that are best 
addressed communally. Human rights issues, as noted, might be most 
productively sorted within cultural communities, as might questions 
about the appropriateness of particular social and political practices and 
institutions. There are no agreed universal values and designs about 
these matters. Why should there be? Issues of development and 
modernization also might actually be better handled within cultural 
communities instead according to universal models, standards and 
attributed aspirations. Why does "modernization" have to mean 
becoming like the West? Each of the great cultures developed life 
support algorithms that sustained countless generations. Why cannot 
"development" and "modernization" mean improving upon these? 
For other kinds of issues the most appropriate locus of problem-
defining and problem-solving activity, and the most suitable theater for 
international cooperation is the geographic region. The geography of 
human settlement being what it is, geographic regions and cultural 
communities regularly overlap. Most of the most volatile security 
issues in the post-Cold War world are regional, not global. The danger 
of a global conflagration is lower today than at any time in the last 
century and this condition is likely to persist until well into the next 
century. Today, therefore, the appropriate conflict-resolving (and 
peacekeeping) forums of first resort ought to be regional international 
organizations. Logically, United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping 
ought to backstop regional efforts . Presently, very few regional 
organizations actually act as conflict-preventers or conflict-resolvers, 
and those that occasionally do, like the Organization of African Unity, 
the Arab League, the Organization of American States, and the newly 
ambitious Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have not 
been very successful. The capacitie s of these organizations surely 
should be enhanced. 
Environmental problems are also more regional than global, and 
indeed the worst cases of pollution are national and local. IL is no doubt 
good for the conscience, and certainly good for the media and those who 
wish Lo be exposed by them, to hold international conclaves with casts 
of thousands aimed at protesting the despoiling of the earth. Nor is 
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there anything wrong with mobilizing commitments to do something 
about the beleaguered ecosystem. The Rio Conference on the 
environment was the UN's grandest extravaganza, and its organizers 
deserve credit for making it happen. 
But, how many of mankind's environmental woes are actually 
global? There are a few such problems to be sure. The greenhouse 
phenomenon, if indeed there really is one, is everybody's problem with 
regard to both causes and effects. The same can be said with regard to 
the hole in the earth's ozone layer. But stopping the browning of the 
blue Danube is a central European problem, and halting the similar 
sliming of great rivers around the world are problems for regional 
riparian neighbors. Cleaning the cesspool that the Mediterranean Sea 
has become is a problem for the littoral countries; halting the washing 
of East Africa's topsoil into the Indian Ocean is an East African 
problem; combating desertification in sub-Saharan Africa is a sub-
Saharan African problem; preventing acid rain is a North American and 
North European problem; freshening polluted air in Mexico City and 
Beijing are Mexican and Chinese problems respectively; removing the 
debris floating in Boston's harbor is Boston's problem. The point here 
is not that those of us not directly affected should ignore these many 
problems. It is rather that those of us not directly affected cannot do 
very much about solving most of the problems. Neither can the United 
Nations at the lofty level of global policy-making do very much. The 
United Nations can pontificate about perils to the planet Earth, and it 
can even set down global action plans and establish global goals and 
standards for environmental purification. It can insist that development 
must be environmentally "sustainable." But the cooperation required to 
deal with environmental perils is not global; it is rather regional among 
affected countries, national among affected communities and local 
among affected individuals. 
There is no need to further belabor the non-globalness of human 
affairs. What was said about the regional loci of security issues, and 
the regional and national loci of most environmental problems, could 
also be said with regard to issues having to do with ethnic and religious 
minorities, with migration and refugees, food and agriculture, and 
increasingly even with international trade . Different countries and 
peoples inhabiting different regions of the planet have different kinds of 
problems and different ways of solving them. At the level of grand 
rhetoric much can be cast in generic terms, and regional and local 
problems can be conceived as variants of global ones. But on the 
ground, where the problem-solving has to take place, universalistic 
descriptions and prescriptions tend not to be terribly helpful. During an 
interview in 1989 dealing with stratgies for economic development, a 
diplomat from Thailand explained what his country was doing to 
generate capital, but he cautioned against generalizing from the Thai 
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experience by concluding: "you must remember, Thailand is not 
Africa!" 
To return to relevance in our part of this century and on into the 
next, the United Nations needs to dispense with myths of universality 
and abandon the globalistic ideology that drives its policy-making. It 
needs to institutionalize cultural diversity rather than moving to 
supersede it. It most assuredly needs to avoid promoting Westernism 
under the rubrics of development, modernization, human rights and 
democracy. The United Nations has to be a place where the cultural 
communities of the world can come together to communicate with and 
learn from one another; it can no longer be a place where cultural 
communities come together to homogenize or hegemonize. Ideally, the 
UN should evolve into a place where ground rules for peaceful inter-
cultural relations can be formulated, just as it has been a place where 
ground rules for peaceful inter-state relations were formulated. 
The UN must decentralize, indeed de-globalize. This could very 
well mean withdrawing completely from problem areas and policy 
realms where globalistic solutions do not apply. Or, it could mean 
regionalizing all programmes where diversities render globalistic 
approaches inept, and devolving considerable autonomy and authority to 
regional UN institutions and their managers. Better still would be a 
sweeping effort by governments to regionalize their approaches and in 
so doing either strengthen existing regional international organizations 
or establish new ones as needed . In any event, the problem solvers 
must be brought closer to the problems, or else international 
cooperation will have an unpromising future. 
Reforming the United Nations 
We hear so often today that "if the United Nations did not exist, 
world conditions would demand that it be created." To be sure, the 
United Nations organization is essential in the post-cold war world. 
But, were we to create the United Nations today, it is doubtful that we 
would re-establish the organization that was chartered in 1945, because 
such an organization would be of limited use under present-day 
conditions. It is also doubtful that we would actually be able to charter 
a new world organization today because intensifying West-Non-West 
differences would foreclose international consensus concerning the 
structure, mission and functioning of such a body. A new Charter 
would never emerge. Fortunately, we do not have to create a new world 
organization for the 1990s and beyond, but we do desperately need to 
reform the one we have. 
The thrust of the arguments in this essay suggests that reforming 
the UN to make it relevant in the context of contemporary conditions 
will require substantial changes. The logic of comparative institutional 
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advantage recommends that what the UN can do singularly well should 
be kept in the reformed body as long as the activity in question serves a 
useful international purpose. But what the UN does poorly or what 
other agencies can do better should be kept out of the reformed body. 
What the UN does that is of little use, no matter how well or poorly it 
does it, should also be kept out. 
First, the peacemaking and peacekeeping functions of the United 
Nations should be retained and emphasized. A UN reformed to fit the 
contexts of the 1990s and beyond should be primarily a peacemaking 
and peacekeeping organization. Everything possible therefore should be 
done to enhance the organization's capacities to act under both Chapter 
VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. This includes, as recommended 
above, the establishment of a standing United Nations army, sized and 
armed to intervene quickly and decisively to quell threats to peace 
arising from both international and intra-national conflicts. Additional 
mechanisms should be created to make it possible for the United 
Nations to cooperate more widely and effectively with regional 
organizations on matters of peacemaking and peacekeeping. When 
peace is imperiled in regions, the UN should intervene only after 
regional agencies have failed or appear likely to fail or when they ask 
for assistance. If preserving the consensus that makes UN peacemaking 
and peacekeeping possible requires that the Security Council be 
restructured to better represent the international distribution of power 
and influence, then the Security Council should be restructured without 
delay. At the very least, Japan and Germany should become permanent 
members of the Security Council, and a way should be found to keep 
regional powers like India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico, 
nearly always on the Council. 
Second, the United Nations should exit the development field. The 
Organization's unimpressive record as a development institution, the 
constraints of intergovernmentalism, the North-South new cold war 
context of world politics and the availability of other more promising 
agents all recommend that the UN should relinguish its development 
m1ss1on. The entire multi-lateral development effort should be 
decentralized--communalized culturally and regionalized geographically 
and financially. To the extent possible institutional contexts should be 
created that avoid North-South or West-Non-West politicization, which 
means, practically speaking, keeping the West out of development 
issues and institutions. There are many meanings to development; 
peoples must be empowered to define it and pursue it as best suits their 
needs and heritages. Institutional contexts should also be created that 
better integrate governmental and non-governmental wisdom and action: 
NGOs should be the moving forces for development. 
Third, to the extent that it implies supranational or transcultural 
community, or aspirations to create such communities, globalism 
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should be abandoned as the UN's operating ideology . This is not 
because globalism is necessarily philosophically flawed, but rather 
because it is fanciful under prevailing world conditions. Instead of 
promoting globalism in a world of proliferating diversity, the United 
Nations might much more usefully take diversity as the great given of 
our time and promote inter-cultural communication, toleration and 
learning. Ironically , the only organ of the United Nations system 
principally dedicated to doing this is UNESCO, and that agency is today 
in a state of disarray. UNESCO desperately needs to be revitalized. 
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